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TOWARDS AN OVERREGULATED CYBERSPACE: 
CRIMINAL LAW PERSPECTIVE
by
ALEŠ ZAVRŠNIK*
The central thesis of the paper is that some criminal law solutions and responses by  
criminal justice systems to cybersecurity threats across Europe and the USA raise  
substantial  public policy and human rights concerns. The thesis is explained by  
presenting the criminal justice systems’ reactions to cybercrime as they are mani-
fested in cybercrime prevention strategies (for instance in data retention regulation  
and in the changed nature of cybercrime policing), substantive criminal law solu-
tions (for instance with incrimination of mere illegal access) and criminal proced-
ure possibilities that are granting law enforcement impressive powers (for instance  
with on-line searches and seizures). These changes are heading towards an over-
regulated cyberspace.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Current responses by criminal justice systems to cybersecurity threats show 
how the solutions of problems can become problems on their own and how 
not only cybersecurity threats and incidents cause damage and problems 
but also the reaction to these problems by a criminal justice system that is 
the most powerful and coercive system of formal control.1
* Aleš  Završnik,  LL.D.,  Junior  Research  Associate  at  the  Institute  of  Criminology  at  the 
Faculty of Law, Ljubljana. Address: Poljanski nasip 2, SI-1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. E-mail: 
ales.zavrsnik@pf.uni-lj.si; www.inst-krim.si.
1 For the purpose of the article, the notion of a “criminal justice system” is used in a broad 
sense. It encompasses not only the activities of public agencies, the police, prosecutors and 
criminal courts, but also the legislation guiding these actors, i.e. criminal codes, criminal 
procedures, (“preventive”) data retention regulation etc. For instance, in comparison to the 
analysis of cybersecurity networks made by Nhan and Huey (2008), which identified four 
“nodal clusters” or “ sets of institutional actors”, the broad notion of the “criminal justice 
system” encompasses not only the law enforcement “nodal cluster” but also the govern-
ment’s activities.
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The article focuses on cybercrime as it is perceived and responded to by 
criminal justice systems in some European nation states and the USA. The 
perception  and response  is  “measured”  by  analysis  of  selected  national 
criminal  legislation  and  solutions  contained  in  international  legal  docu-
ments. The once central dilemma in the theory of cybercrime between “old 
wine new bottles” protagonists2 and “new wine no bottles” protagonists3 
has evolved into a dilemma of how to stop the dark future of the Internet, 
i.e.  “dark” from the human rights perspective.  By looking closely at  the 
cumbersome responses of criminal justice agencies to cybercrime, the paper 
starts from the thesis advocated by Zittrain4 that today we must face up to 
real problems that are occurring in cyberspace. These problems deserve to 
be scrutinised in detail and cannot be disregarded as mere nuisances. Fail-
ure to confront problems like spam or the underground botnet industry can 
lead  to  a  shadowy  future  for  the  Internet.  However,  the  current  eager 
“fight” against “cybersecurity threats” will also destroy the open nature of 
the Internet, since the “fight” has a serious impact on civil liberties. At least 
some of the legal solutions either incorporated in national criminal codes or 
in supranational regulation and shifts in the organisational-managerial do-
main of criminal  justice agencies that reflect  the cultural impact of IT on 
crime control are firmly heading towards an over-regulated Internet and to 
a situation in which on-line  activities  are becoming more regulated than 
their off-line counterparts.
The article examines the reaction in both crime policy perspectives, i.e. 
the preventive and the repressive perspective. The former includes “soft” 
shifts in crime policy, such as organisational shifts in criminal justice agen-
cies. The repressive perspective encompasses “hard” criminal law reactions 
to cybercrime. These reactions are manifested in re-interpretations and rein-
ventions of substantive criminal law and criminal procedure.
On a general level, the article shows how the reaction to cybercrime and 
“cybersecurity threats” – a notion that is particularly indiscriminately used 
for all sorts of threats, nuisances and (also) accidents – form a part of the mi-
crocosm of larger  cultural  trends,  processes  and shifts  in  criminal  justice 
policy throughout occidental societies. In particular, a part of the wider cul-
tural shift toward a more punitive crime policy and increased criminalisa-
tion of everyday life.
2 Grabosky 2001.
3 Wall 2007.
4 Zittrain 2008.
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2. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM’S RESPONSE TO CYBERCRIME
IT has generated new forms of harm and provoked a new criminal justice 
response to this harm. (1) Substantive criminal law challenges have raised a 
dilemma between “old wine new bottles” and “new wine no bottles” ap-
proaches in  criminological  theory. Today, it  seems that the dilemma is  a 
rather academic one, since the boundary between the old rules (re)inter-
preted in a new way (“old wine new bottles”) and completely new rules 
that have to be created for “new wine” depends on the definition of law. 
What actually are we looking at: law in action or law in books? Either way, 
new concepts such as information,  computers and networks5 have raised 
the latter “new wine no bottles” approach to the fore of criminological and 
criminal law inquiry.
On  the  other  hand,  criminal  justice  systems  have  responded  to  new 
types of crime not only by adapting substantial criminal law provisions and 
introducing new crimes.  Today,  it  seems that  moulding new taxonomies 
and definitions of cybercrime was only the first part of a wider process of 
“criminal justice complex” engagement in cyberspace. Faced with the need 
for efficient crime control, the agents of the criminal justice system have also 
changed their mode of conduct, thus also (2) new rules of criminal proced-
ure and (3) new technologically enhanced crime prevention strategies have 
been  introduced.  Although changes to  substantial  provisions  of  criminal 
law have caused  manifold  challenges,  I  suggest  that  these  modifications 
have  not  (yet)  fundamentally  changed  the  very  nature  of  the  “criminal 
justice  complex”.  As  we  shall  see,  the  combination  of  risk  management 
mentalities has led to enhanced pre-crime activities of state actors. Further-
more, crime control has become “big business” and pre-crime control is not 
only performed by state actors, but also by public-private partnership and 
private entities. Changes in crime prevention strategies illuminate not only 
evolutionary re-wiring of the “criminal justice complex”, but (fundamental) 
revolutionary changes of legal adjudication.
3. CYBERCRIME PREVENTION STRATEGIES
Although  new  technologically  enhanced crime  prevention  strategies  are 
manifold,  there  is  a  specific  measure  that  lies  at  the  core  of  the  “data 
nation”6 regulatory framework. It is obligatory retention of traffic data, loca-
tion data, subscriber data and facts/circumstances with regard to unsuccess-
ful call attempts (hereinafter traffic data) related to internet access, e-mail 
5 Walden 2007.
6 Garfinkel 2000.
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and internet telephony. The regulation was introduced with the post 9/11 
Patriot Act7 in the USA and the Data Retention Directive in the EU. Accord-
ing to Bloss8 the Patriot Act modified or revised fifteen federal laws, focus-
ing primarily on counter-terrorism and foreign intelligence, and became the 
catalyst for statutory surveillance revisions. The EU Data Retention Direct-
ive has had similar  surveillance  effects.  Some states  and numerous non-
state stakeholders have protested against the directive,9 Ireland and Poland 
most decisively by disputing it before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
At least for now, we are stuck with the directive, since the ECJ has only de-
cided that the directive was correctly adopted on the basis of the EC Treaty, 
since it  relates predominantly to the functioning of the internal market.10 
This may change, since the ECJ will  have to take a stand on the issue of 
whether or not the directive violates the right to privacy (Charter of Funda-
mental Rights).
The impact  of  IT on crime control  cannot  be appropriately evaluated 
without recognizing the trend of amplified usage of IT in policing. “Intelli-
gence-led policing”11 is  becoming  the  prototype  of all police work. Data 
gathering, its storage, analysis (“data mining” techniques) and transmission 
of digitised  data,  the  introduction  of expert  analysts  and their  high-tech 
tools in the crime investigation process has caused a revolution in policing.12 
According to Bloss,13 advances in technology have substantially contributed 
to the ability of the police to engage in electronic surveillance of citizens, 
since personal electronic communications can be intercepted with greater 
ease and, to some extent, with less physical intrusion. What we are witness-
ing today is a transformation of policing, the introduction of new operation-
al  approaches  and surveillance  practices  that  focus  more on information 
and intelligence gathering.14
The IT triggered paradigm shift in policing is further enhanced by the 
widening police surveillance capabilities that are a result  of collaboration 
7 “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act”, later known as the “USA Patriot Act of 2001” (hereafter Patri-
ot Act).
8 Bloss 2007.
9 For instance, in Italy “The Electronic Frontiers Italy” (ALCEI), in Romania “Asociatia pentru 
Tehnologie si Internet” (A.P.T.I.), in UK “The Privacy International” (PI), in Macedonia the 
NGO alliance “Metamorphosis”, in Germany “The German Working Group on Data Reten-
tion” (AK Vorrat) and in Bulgaria “Access to Information Program (AIP) Foundation”. See 
European Digital Rights, 2009.
10 See the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in case  Ireland v. 
Parliament and Council (Case C-301/06).
11 Lemieux, 2008.
12 Lemieux 2008.
13 Bloss 2007: 211.
14 Peterson 2005; Carter 2004.
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with  private  commercial  enterprises.  Private  entities  can  obtain  personal 
data and eavesdrop on the public more than ever before.15 The reasons for 
such “joint ventures” in policing endeavours are a result of a failure.16 They are 
a countermeasure to the police’s lack of manpower and technical expertise.
The cumulative outcome of the IT effect on criminal  justice system is 
thus very controversial. There is a reluctance on the part of legal profession-
als working in the system to use IT, on the one hand, but there is also a very 
strong effect of IT in what Cole17 refers to as “preventive law enforcement”.
That is a tendency to use greater surveillance powers to reduce threats 
and prosecute offenders.18 Similarly, according to Leman-Langlois,19 more 
than ever before and in any other type of late-modern policing, “technopoli-
cing” involves multiple entities. State-centred police organizations are but 
one actor in the overall production of “technosecurity”. Furthermore, in a 
different terminology put forward by Nhan and Huey,20 there are now dif-
ferent types of “nodal clusters” or “sets of institutional actors” that must be 
taken into account when elaborating contemporary policing: in addition to 
government  and law enforcement,  also  private  industry  and the  general 
public.
The  paradigm  of  cybercrime  policing  has  initiated  institutional  re-
arrangements of order-maintenance.  Wall,21 for  instance,  identifies  an as-
semblage of actors engaged in cyber policing that are forming a “multi-layer 
order-maintenance  assemblage”.  This  order-maintenance complex encom-
passes new police and prosecution forces and new e-justice concepts,  but 
not limited to only these traditional actors that were once central in main-
taining  order.  When  identifying  the  “multi-agency  cross-sector  partner-
ships”, Wall22 specifies a range of new actors, such as internet users’ organ-
isations,  virtual environment managers,  network infrastructure providers, 
private corporate security personnel, non-governmental non-police hybrids 
and governmental non-police bodies  (such as customs),  which are all  fo-
cused on security maintenance alongside the public (governmental) police.
The next section narrows the examination of the IT impact on the crimin-
al justice system to cybercrime and examine substantive criminal law provi-
sions.  It must be said that cybercrime should be taken seriously, but the 
15 O’Harrow 2005; Bridis and Solomon 2006.
16 Bloss 2007.
17 Cole 2007.
18 Nhan and Huey 2008.
19 Leman-Langlois 2008: 6.
20 Nhan and Huey 2008.
21 Wall 2007.
22 Wall 2007.
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threats have to be dealt with a “trembling hand”. In so doing, one has to 
take two facts into account. On the one hand, there is a tendency in the liter-
ature on cybercrime to use vague anxiety provoking terms such as “cyberse-
curity”, which do not carry much (or any?) explanatory power.23 On the oth-
er hand, there is an increasing desire to control cyberspace24 and we should 
pay attention to the illusion that when we are told (that) there is such thing 
as  “computer  crime”,  the concepts  seems closer  to  the natural  laws that 
gave us computers than to the artificial laws that gave us crimes. In reality, 
according to Leman-Langlois,25 “technocrime is a Gordian knot of political 
interests,  economic interests,  legal  rules,  technological  developments,  po-
lice, private security and forensics expertise … and other forms of power we 
have yet to map.”
4. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW CHALLENGES
4.1. CONTENT CRIME
The categories of content-related cybercrime that are particularly controver-
sial in terms of fundamental rights and liberties, especially the right to pri-
vacy and freedom of expression, are criminalization of virtual child porno-
graphy and criminalization of extreme and violent pornography.
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a “child” as a 
“human being younger than 18 years” (Article 1). Both the CoE’s Conven-
tion and the EU Council Framework Decision on combating the sexual ex-
ploitation of children and child pornography26 (hereinafter EU Framework 
Decision on child pornography) define a child in the same way. It is doubt-
ful whether the age limit is appropriate for all countries, since juvenile of-
fenders are not exempted from criminal responsibility in some countries. A 
situation in which they can be held fully criminally responsible for their acts 
but  are  simultaneously  exempted  from being  able  to  decide  about  their 
sexual representation is at least unbalanced. The CoE Convention thus en-
ables states to set a lower age limit, but there is no equivalent reservation in 
the EU Framework Decision on child pornography.
There  are  many types  of  child  pornography.  Real  child  pornography 
should be distinguished from images of children in provocative presenta-
23 Doria  explains  that  “cybersecurity”  is  understood differently  by  “techies”  and lawyers, 
criminologists and national security experts. It is unclear whether it denotes technical, crim-
inological, sociological or legal aspects of security. It is also unclear what is the object of 
such security: network safety, computer safety, safety of society, of e-business, fundamental 
liberties or national sovereignty? Doria 2007.
24 Gagnon, 2008.
25 Leman-Langlois 2008: 4.
26 2004/68/JHA of 22 December 2003.
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tions (for  instance  “child  glamour presentations”)  and from virtual  child 
pornography. The creation of child pornography is very likely to have been 
connected  with  child  abuse  (New  York  v.  Ferber).27 The  abuse  is  un-
doubtedly an element of real child pornography, but never a part of virtual 
child pornography. In defining virtual child pornography, one should dis-
tinguish  different  types  of  material:  drawings  existing  in  the  real  world 
published on-line, modified images of natural persons so they can no longer 
be identified and computer-generated images (“pseudo-photographs”),  in 
which  the  production  of  the  material  (with  so-called  digital  imaging  or 
morphing techniques) is no longer bound to taking and manipulating pic-
tures of real people. 
The CoE Convention defines “child pornography” as pornographic ma-
terial  that  visually  depicts  sexually  explicit  conduct  (it  is  not  relevant 
whether the conduct depicted is real or simulated, i.e., including actors)28 of 
one of three types of material: (1) a real child, (2) a person appearing to be a 
minor or (3) images which do not in fact involve a real person.29 The Explan-
atory Report to the CoE Convention instructs that the third type includes 
pictures that are altered, such as morphed images of natural persons, and 
even generated entirely by a computer. The objects of criminal protection 
are therefore different: the first type focuses directly on protection against 
child abuse, while the other two types aim at providing protection against 
behaviour that might be used to encourage or seduce children into particip-
ating in such acts.30 These materials, though called “child” pornography, do 
not depict any concrete person. The criminalization focuses on the preparat-
ory phase of crime that might be committed.
While it is clear that protection against child abuse (material depicting 
real children) is a legitimate goal of a state’s criminal law intervention, it re-
mains unclear whether providing criminal protection against behaviour that 
might provoke criminal activity is a legitimate reason for criminalisation – 
we punish an act that might represent encouragement and seduction to pos-
sible criminal activity in the future. The intent of an offender to commit fur-
ther crimes in the future, i.e., to abuse a concrete child, should be an essen-
tial part of a more balanced criminalization of virtual child pornography.
The criminalization of virtual child pornography thus instrumentalizes 
criminal law. The criminal law becomes a risk management tool, since its fo-
cus shifts from a past event to a (possible) future event on a basis of a very 
27 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
28 See the Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, Point 100.
29 The CoE Convention, Article 9.
30 The Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime, Paragraphs 93 and 102. 
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unclear causal link. Such provisions thus encroach on “the freedom to en-
gage in a substantial amount of lawful speech”31 and criminalise thoughts. 
They also change the purpose, if not the very idea, of criminal law. Criminal 
law becomes a mere symbolic tool for expression and protection of public 
morals. In this regard, it also breaches the ultima ratio principle of criminal 
law. 
There clearly exists confusion in the reasoning of the virtual child porno-
graphy prohibition. Is it a concrete child, the idea/dignity of children or the 
morals of children that we are trying to protect? Human dignity has been 
recognized as an object of penal protection in criminal law theory, but only 
the human dignity of a concrete and not of an abstract person. Morals also 
cannot directly be the object of penal protection nor the indignation people 
might experience when encountering such material.  The pragmatic argu-
ment that it is difficult  to distinguish real child images from virtual ones 
also does not carry plausible theoretical value. Crime investigation has nev-
er been a simple endeavour and digital environment investigations are no 
exception.
In defining types of  child  pornographic  material,  the Framework De-
cision on child pornography is more balanced. A member state may exclude 
from criminal  liability:  (1)  images of  children having reached the age of 
sexual  consent  that  are  produced  and possessed  with  their  consent  and 
solely for their own private use (for production and possession), (2) images 
of a real person appearing to be a child that was in fact 18 years of age and 
(3) virtual child pornography that is produced and possessed by the produ-
cer solely for his or her own private use.32
The criminalization of extreme and violent pornography is similar to vir-
tual child pornography to the extent that it  criminalizes acts without vic-
tims. However, it is also a very different scenario since it criminalises acts of 
consenting adults. Applying criminal law in such cases raises all the doubts 
mentioned  above  and  also  raised  by  content  control  strategies.  These 
strategies apply only to a limited number of crimes, but grant law enforce-
ment powers across types of conduct that should stay in the domain of pri-
vacy. The effects of internet filtering are very much known: it is flawed, it 
raises human rights concerns and, in a long term, it stifles innovation and 
creativity.
31 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002).
32 Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA on combating the 
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography.
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4.2. INFRINGEMENT OF IP RIGHTS
The criminalization of infringements of intellectual property (IP) rights is 
the next example of a disproportionate criminal law reaction in protecting 
perfectly  legitimate  interests.  Empirical  research,  for  instance,  conducted 
among graduate students at the Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana, on 
downloading copyrighted material showed that accessing such material via 
Torrents is a part of the teenage subculture and a learning process of how to 
use the Internet and PC. The most disturbing fact that the research showed 
was that the Slovene Criminal Code (KZ) criminalised the vast majority of 
internet  users  in  the  attempt  to  protect  copyright  and  related  rights. 
Namely, the criminal offence of unauthorized use of copyrighted material33 
could be committed by mere possession of copyright material. The only lim-
itation was a “high total market value” of the material.34
As theorists have persuasively shown,35 the problem of IP infringements 
in the digital environment is a temporary one. “Always on” connections are 
making it easier to subscribe to a database containing such material than to 
download the material and be a database manager. They have also shown 
that the damage caused by P2P technologies is dubious, since types of users 
are manifold: some may use it for downloading material that is no longer 
protected by copyright laws; others may download the material only to test 
it  in order to proceed with a purchase; many download the material but 
never have the chance to check it at all.
Furthermore, a recent Dutch study36 on the cultural and economic bene-
fits of file sharing music, film and games showed that the economic implica-
tions of file sharing for the level of welfare in the Netherlands are strongly 
positive in both short and long terms. File sharing provides consumers with 
access to a broad range of cultural products, which typically raises welfare.
The general trend in the criminal law protection of copyright and related 
rights is shifting in the direction of higher punitiveness. The CoE Conven-
tion was still reasonable in the protection of intellectual property rights. It 
binds the signatories to criminalize infringements if they are committed in-
tentionally and on a commercial scale. However, subsequent EU attempts to 
strengthen the protection of copyright and related rights are raising con-
cerns. A French proposal for a “three-strike scheme” whereby persistent in-
33 The Slovene Criminal Code, Article 159 (“Unauthorized use of copyright work”).
34 The Slovene Criminal Code (KZ) was subsequently changed in this regard. The new Crim-
inal Code (KZ-1), which entered into force in November 1, 2008, does not criminalize mere 
unauthorized possession of copyright work. It additionally requires the intent to sell the 
copyright work (Article 148 KZ-1).
35 For instance Lessig, 2004.
36 Huygen et al., 2008.
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fringements of IP rights would be sanctioned by cutting off subscriptions 
can only be described as an overreaction to the problem, leading to the ab-
use of repressive power of the state. Proposals of a contribution from ISPs 
that enable connectivity to P2P in order to compensate damage to the con-
tent industry also raise doubts. The most elaborate EU proposal has taken 
the criminal law protection of copyright and related rights even further.
A proposed EU directive on criminal measures aimed at ensuring the en-
forcement of intellectual property rights (so-called Second Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights Enforcement Directive or “IPRED2”),37 which aims at comple-
menting  the  “IPR  Enforcement  Directive”  (“IPRED”)38 requires  Member 
States to ensure that all intentional infringements of an intellectual property 
right on a commercial scale, and attempting, aiding or abetting and inciting 
such infringements, are treated as criminal offences.39 Mere criminalisation 
of incitement to infringement of IP rights overturns the balance in the na-
tional criminal codes of member states that do not even criminalize inciting 
far more serious offences. Additionally, the prescribed penalties are severe: 
at least 4 years imprisonment and, additionally, at least 300,000€ fine for an 
aggravated form of the criminal offence and at least 100.000€ fine for the ba-
sic form of the offence. 
4.3. ILLEGAL ACCESS
The CoE Convention and the EU Framework Decision on attacks against in-
formation systems40 oblige signatories and member states to criminalize acts 
against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data and 
systems (so-called “C.I.A. offences”). The criminal offence of illegal access 
to the whole or any part of “a computer system” (the CoE Convention) or 
“an information system” (the EU Framework Decision) has remained one of 
the most controversial in terms of disproportionate substantive criminal law 
provisions.
The main argument against criminalization of access to an information 
system is that it stifles future development of computer (security) software. 
So-called “penetration tests” are regularly used to identify gaps and vulner-
abilities of computer systems and networks. The criminalisation hence pro-
hibits the early stages of software development process. It shows that con-
cepts developed for the off-line environment cannot be used for the digital 
37 COM(2006)0168 final, 2005/0127(COD), April 26, 2006.
38 Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. Official Journal of the European Union L 157 of 
30 April 2004.
39 IPRED2, Article 3.
40 EU Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA on attacks against information systems of 
24.2.2005, OJ L 69, 16.3.2005.
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world by mere analogy. Similarly to the criminalisation of virtual child por-
nography, criminal law reaches further into the preparatory phases of com-
mitting a crime. However, unfortunately, the criminalization of access to an 
information system in cases of computer software development coincides 
with the phase of creating the very digital space that we are trying to pro-
tect. The very creation of new computer software is ordinarily connected to 
some form of access to another computer software or information system in 
order to provide interoperability or interconnectivity. 
The signatories of the CoE Convention did not reach complete agree-
ment on the criminalization of illegal access to a computer system. The cur-
rent provision thereby allows countries to criminalize mere illegal access41 
without any additional conditions. Such a “margin of appreciation” has led 
some countries to set additional restrictions,  such as, for instance, the re-
striction  that  the  offence  of  illegally  accessing  an information  system be 
committed by infringing security measures or that the perpetrator acts with 
the intent of committing further acts.42
4.4. MODES OF EXECUTION
The  substantive  criminal  law concepts  of  “possession”,  “procuring”  and 
“supplying” were created for the physical environment. The digital envir-
onment considerably changes the meaning of what it means to “possess”, to 
“procure” or to “supply” prohibited material. The nature of the internet as a 
network of networks means that “material” resides on different computers 
(servers) and is constantly moving. Additionally, supposedly disputed “ma-
terial” is always disentangled into packets that travel separately and take 
different routes.
At the beginning of internet development, criminal law theory required 
that a person had to download material in order to be recognised as being a 
“possessor” of the material. A form of permanent storage of the data was re-
quired. Mere surfing on the Internet was not considered to be a form of a 
temporary “possession” of the displayed material.  Accordingly, surfing a 
web page with child  pornography images,  for  instance,  was not be con-
sidered a child pornography offence.
It became evident that criminalizing only the supply of prohibited ma-
terial would not eradicate the disputed content. The demand for prohibited 
material should be prohibited as well. By focusing on the purely technical 
aspects of digital technology it became clear that surfing the Internet tech-
nically means that the user’s appliance more or less automatically saves di-
41 The U.K. Computer Misuse Act 1990 criminalizes mere illegal access to a computer system.
42 Sieber 2008: 142.
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gital material in some from. One always leaves a “digital fingerprint”. For 
instance,  when  browsing  the  Internet  the  computer  automatically  stores 
data in the so-called cache memory (i.e. RAM memory that is set aside as 
specialized  buffer  storage  that  is  continually  updated),  or,  for  instance, 
cookies are almost automatically installed on a user’s hard disc during web 
page browsing. These examples show how IT blurs the definition of “pos-
session” that was created for the off-line environment.
IT also blurs once straightforward demarcations of possession from the 
“procurement” or “supply” of digital material. Some countries prohibit the 
supply and procurement of controversial material but not also its posses-
sion. When one is downloading material in P2P networks, one is simultan-
eously making it  available for the use of others. The very essence of P2P 
technology is that users enable access to the disc spaces of other users. This 
kind of voluntary permission cannot be disputed. However, the mere use of 
file sharing technology may lead to “procurement” or “supply” of the illeg-
al digital material.
The  question,  therefore,  is  whether  a  user  can  be  held  criminally  re-
sponsible for content that is temporarily stored in the cache memory of his 
or her computer? For instance, in a case in which a user has coincidentally 
visited a homepage containing child  pornography but  did not delete the 
temporary storage? It could be criminalized as a criminal act of omission, 
but such criminalisation is reaching too far in the domain of the free use of 
the IT. The EU Framework Decision on child pornography is balanced in 
this regard, since it obliges member states to prohibit the mere possession of 
child pornography only if the offence is committed intentionally (Article 3).
5. CHALLENGES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A lack of substantial criminal law adaptation has usually been to the detri-
ment of the efficiency of law enforcement: if the substantive rules had been 
adopted, the offenders would have been prosecuted. However, non-adap-
ted criminal procedure provisions, in contrast, have been to the detriment of 
fundamental liberties of the accused. Procedural rules were tailored for col-
lecting physical (not digital, intangible and transient) evidence and eyewit-
ness testimony. Their use in the digital environment requires some refine-
ment in order to prevent the excessive power of law enforcement. 
New rules of criminal  procedure have been created to some extent in 
most European countries. Nevertheless, there is a vast discrepancy between 
jurisdictions. In contrast to the common law countries, where the judiciary 
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has tailored a substantial amount of new detailed procedural rules,43 at least 
in Slovenia, for instance, only recently a proposed Act Amending the Crim-
inal Procedure Act (ZKP-K) has been prepared to address digital and net-
work environment investigations.
Societies’  increasing  dependence  on  digitized  data  makes  digital 
forensics (also called cyber forensics,  or computer and network forensics) 
more and more important. It answers questions of how to collect intangible 
and transient data, how to analyze them and how to preserve the collected 
digital information in a legally acceptable form. In spite of the “electronic 
footprints omnipresence”44 the police and legally trained personnel in the 
criminal justice system are still hesitant to collect intangible transient data. 
According to research on digital forensics45 conducted for the Slovene crim-
inal justice system, criminal court judges do not share enthusiasm for digit-
ization. They are reluctant to use digital evidence and are inclined to rely on 
conventional evidence. In spite of widespread digitalization in Slovene soci-
ety, digital evidence still  represents an insignificant share in all police in-
vestigations. The Slovene police filed almost 500,000 criminal charges in the 
period 2001 – 2006, but only 212 contained digital evidence (0.043 percent).46 
It is difficult to ascertain the reasons for such reluctance but it seems that 
sophisticated networked IT is still very poorly understood by lawyers.
In order to employ digital evidence, digital forensic activities should be 
regulated.  However,  the  question  of  “who  can  act  as  a  cyber  forensic 
expert?” remains unanswered. With the exception of the US and a few EU 
member  states,47 expertise  in  digital  forensics  is  insufficiently  regulated. 
There is no registration of forensic practitioners and only basic guidance on 
handling  digital  evidence  exists.  In  continental  legal  systems,  digital 
forensics is entrusted to expert witnesses and thus regulated by national ex-
pert  witness  administrative  regimes.  The  principle  of  free  evaluation  of 
evidence means that a judge can call  on an expert witness to technically 
evaluate a certain fact. However, due to a lack of understanding of IT and 
its capabilities it is not very likely that an expert witness will be called upon 
to deliver expert evidence in the first place. Another shortcoming in digital 
forensics is thus a lack of appropriate training of law enforcement person-
nel. Because prosecutors and judges are not familiar with IT, they are in-
clined to rely on what they already know. In cases in which such training 
43 Walden 2007.
44 Companies store the majority of information in digital form and by some estimates digital 
information represents as much as 90 percent of all relevant information.
45 Selinšek 2008.
46 Selinšek 2008: 51.
47 See Walden, 2007.
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exists, it is only offered by forensic tools manufacturers, who are inevitabil-
ity pursuing their own agenda.48
Cyber-forensics techniques encompass three groups of activities: (1) cy-
ber-surveillance, (2) surveillance interception and (3) search and seizure.49 
The role of communication service providers (CSPs) in state-instigated cy-
ber-surveillance  remains controversial.  CSPs are obliged to perform state 
imposed obligations. They act as a buffer for invasive privacy intrusions of 
the state, on the one hand, and as an extended “long arm of justice”, on the 
other. Additionally, they have their own commercial interest agenda that 
leads them into a voluntary cyber-surveillance.  They are inclined,  for in-
stance, to engage in excessive spying on their clients by profiling, creating 
databases and monitoring the behaviour patterns of their customers. An in-
dividual  is  under the gaze of not only the state but also private entities, 
which are jointly tightening “the surveillant assemblage”.
Surveillance interception is a process of collecting data from CSPs. An 
absence of a data definition has raised some dilemmas. The conceptual divi-
sion between content data (data transmitted by suspects) and communica-
tions data (data generated by CSPs) has become theoretically flawed. For in-
stance, is a sequence number of a packet communications or content data? 
There are disparities between definitions of data among EU and other coun-
tries. The vast amount of communications data being created by new IT ap-
pliances also shows that communications data can sometimes be more in-
formative about an individual than content data. Registered daily visits to a 
church or a mosque, for instance, in one’s smart phone location-based ap-
plication,  is  more informative than a one sentence self-description saying 
one is a Christian or a Muslim.
There  are  several  further  challenges  that  data  retention  regulation 
should answer: what kind of communications data should CSPs intercept: 
transmitted or (and) stored data, data of which they are in possession or 
also data they are capable of obtaining? Should only public service (net-
work) providers or also private ones retain data? Who should bear the costs 
of interception? According to the EU Data Retention Directive, providers of 
(“only”) publicly available electronic communications services and public 
communications networks within the jurisdiction of member states are ob-
liged to retain the data. The obligation extends to traffic data, location data, 
subscriber’s data and facts and circumstances with regard to unsuccessful 
call attempts. Bearing in mind that the vast amount of data retained per-
48 For instance, training provided by the Cybex Company and its “The European Certificate 
on Cybercrime and Electronic Evidence (ECCE)”. Cybex 2008.
49 Walden 2007.
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tains to every user, the directive jeopardizes fundamental rights and human 
liberties (especially, the right to privacy and the presumption of innocence).
Search and seizure are coercive investigatory powers that enable obtain-
ing data from a suspect.  The new methods of collecting digital  evidence 
have triggered a need for new legal standards. IT tends to divide the pro-
cess of search and seizure into two steps.50 The police first execute a physical 
search to seize  computer hardware and later execute a second electronic 
search to obtain the data from a seized computer storage device. The failure 
of the law to account for the two-stage process of computer searches and 
seizures  has  been  to  the  detriment  of  fundamental  liberties.  A  physical 
search has in practice been more or less automatically followed by an elec-
tronic search, without any judicial overview. Similarly, the extent of a war-
rant’s entry authorisation in cases of domestic wireless networks has still 
not been sufficiently addressed.
The  part  of  the  CoE  Convention  that  deals  with  search  and  seizure 
grants law enforcement impressive powers. If the authorities have grounds 
to believe that the data sought is stored in another computer system (or part 
of it) in its territory and such data is lawfully accessible from or available to 
the initial system, the authorities are supposed to be able expeditiously to 
extend the search to the other system (Article 19). In the light of “on-line 
searches” that enable deep, remote and secret intrusions into the privacy of 
IT users, the provision of Article 19 is overreaching.51
6. CONCLUSION
The dilemma between the problem (cybercrime) and the reaction to “the 
problem” (criminal justice system’s response) shows that the reaction to the 
problem has become a problem on its own. The overextension of criminal 
law jeopardizes civil  liberties (human rights concerns),  our privacy,  free-
dom of expression, freedom of association and fair trial. It has an impact on 
the free use of the Internet and research shows how the disproportionate re-
action to the problem, for instance in the form of data retention,52 have re-
duced IT usage (public policy concerns).
50 Kerr 2005.
51 Similarily, in this regard Sieber warns that the CoE Convention was elaborated between 
1997 and 2000 and that the available investigation tools have rapidly changed in the mean-
time. He thus recommends an update of the procedural tools in the CoE Convention. Sieber 
2008: 161.
52 A research conducted by German research organisation FORSA shows the effects of data re-
tention: 73% of population has heard about the data retention, 11% of the Internet users did 
not use the phone and e-mail because of that, 6% considers that they received less info and 
even 52% claim that they would not use telecommunications services for discussion with a 
pharmacist, psychotherapist or marriage broker. FORSA 2008.
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The police,  the justice system and private enterprises network and or-
ganize in order to control online activities through new nodes and clusters 
and are forming what has been called the “surveillant assemblage”.53 The 
expansion of “dataveillance”54 takes advantage of new surveillance techno-
logies, such as mechanisms to monitor, screen and analyse records of bil-
lions of telephone and email communications; localisation possibilities (“po-
sitioning”) determine the location of an individual or create a movement 
profile  (with,  for instance,  GSM triangulation,  electronic  toll  payment re-
cords,  GPS technology, wireless  networks,  radio-frequency identity tags); 
on-line search and seizures can remotely and secretly monitor a suspect’s 
online activities,  password and email,  the computer’s camera and micro-
phone.55 Intelligence-led policing56 has become the new prototype of poli-
cing styles and boundaries of military, intelligence and police intelligence 
that are blurring render our fundamental rights highly vulnerable.
On the basis of the analysis of cybercrime prevention strategies, (several) 
substantive criminal law solutions and (no)adjustments of the rules of crim-
inal  procedure  one can  only  conclude  that  criminal  justice  policy  across 
western CoE countries is heading towards an over-regulated Internet.
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